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Abstract 
One firm invests in security to defend against cyber attacks by two hackers. Each hacker 
chooses an optimal attack, and they share information with each other about the firm’s 
vulnerabilities. Each hacker prefers to receive information, but delivering gives competitive 
advantage to the other hacker. We find that each hacker’s attack and information sharing are 
strategic complements while one hacker’s attack and the other hacker’s information sharing are 
strategic substitutes. The attack is inverse U-shaped in the firm’s unit defense cost, and reaches 
zero, while the firm’s defense and profit decrease, and the hackers’ information sharing and 
profit increase. The firm’s profit increases in the hackers’ unit cost of attack, while the hackers’ 
information sharing and profit decrease. Our analysis also reveals the interesting result that the 
cumulative attack level of the hackers is not affected by the effectiveness of information sharing 
between them and moreover, is also unaffected by the intensity of joint information sharing. We 
also find that as the effectiveness of information sharing between hackers  increases relative to 
the investment in attack, the firm’s investment in cyber security defense and profit are constant, 
the hackers’ investments in attacks decrease, and information sharing levels and hacker profits 
increase. In contrast, as the intensity of joint information sharing increases, while the firm’s 
investment in cyber security defense and profit remain constant, the hackers’ investments in 
attacks increase, and the hackers’ information sharing levels and profits decrease. Increasing the 
firm’s asset causes all the variables to increase linearly, except information sharing which is 
constant. We extend our analysis to endogenize the firm’s asset and this analysis largely 
confirms the preceding analysis with a fixed asset. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing ubiquity of the Internet provides cyber hackers more opportunities to 
misappropriate or corrupt an organization's data resources. There are many well known 
examples of cyber-hacking such as Egghead.com which faced a massive backlash from its 
customers after being hacked in 2000 and Travelocity where hackers exposed the personal 
information of thousands of customers who had participated in an online promotion in 2001. 
Even well established firms like Citibank, Microsoft and NASA, among others have been 
targeted and hacked by cyber perpetrators.  
For a while now, it has been recognized that a key factor required to improve computer and 
information security is the gathering, analysis and sharing of information related to successful, 
as well as unsuccessful attempts at, computer security breaches. To encourage information 
sharing among organizations, the US federal government has encouraged the establishment of 
Security Based Information Sharing Organizations (SB/ISOs) of various kinds, such as 
Information Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISACs), CERT, INFRAGARD, etc. Similar initiatives 
have been taken in other parts of the world. 
There are several positive aspects to sharing information about security incidents and 
vulnerabilities. These benefits include both the prevention of further security breaches in the 
future (e.g., identifying and repairing vulnerabilities in their information security systems) as 
well as increased sales resulting from more effective security products and better security 
reputation among consumers. Questions on information sharing, economic incentives and social 
welfare similar to those noted above have been previously studied in the context of other 
organizations. Of particular relevance is the extensive literature on trade associations (TAs). 
Previous relevant work includes in the literature on oligopolies, cooperative relationships, joint 
ventures, and trade associations (Gal-Or 1986, Kirby 1988, Novshek and Sonnenschein 1982, 
Shapiro 1986, Vives 1990). More recently, information sharing among firms to defend against 
cyber attacks has been analyzed by Gordon, Loeb and Lucyshyn (2003), Gal-Or and Ghose 
(2005), and Hausken (2006).  The focus of Gordon et al. (2003) is on how information sharing 
affects the overall level of information security. They highlight the tradeoff that firms face 
between improved information security and the potential for free riding, which can lead to 
under-investment in security expenditures. While Gordon et al. (2003) focus on the cost side 
 4
effects of security breaches and information sharing, Gal-or and Ghose (2005) focus on the 
demand side effects and highlight the strategic implication of competition in the product market 
on information sharing and security technology investment levels. 
Information sharing among hackers is different. Firms subject to attacks would naturally prefer 
that such information sharing and cooperation among hackers does not take place. As part of 
their activities, hackers compile information about firms’ vulnerabilities and defense strategies, 
attempt to gain access to the information the firms collect about their security breaches and share 
the information among each other. 
 
What motivates hackers to hack? Howard (1997) identified the five possible objectives for 
hackers- financial gain, a desire for challenges, political gain, a desire to cause destruction, 
and leisure activities.1 Some research has pointed out that greed, power, and revenge are 
superseding curiosity and other benign motivations (Jordan and Taylor 1998). Similarly some 
work in the sociology and computer science literature (Raymond 2001) on motivation of hackers 
has pointed out that because of issues such as reputation and competition amongst hackers in 
order to get more recognition within the community, hackers may have incentives to not share 
information with each other. Indeed hackers actively compete with one another to write the 
best software, frequently one-upping each other in displays of coding prowess. Combining 
hacker egos with their practice of sharing fixes amongst one another and the sheer joy 
hackers take from hacking, one can clearly understand how reputation plays a large role as 
pointed out by Ritchie (2000). On the other hand, there has also been discussion about how 
hackers generally don’t believe in keeping secrets and are quite keen to share information 
(Brunker 1998)3 and not necessarily compete for reputation from a sociological view (Risan 
2000). In sum, we believe there are reasons for both viewpoints but the key point is that hackers 
do share information with each other. 
 
This paper analyzes two hackers who may share information about a firm’s vulnerabilities, in 
addition to designing the size of their attacks. The firm invests in information technology 
                                                 
1 He further developed a taxonomy of the hacking process involving the attacker, tools, access, results and 
objectives of attacks. Kjaerland (2005) extended to account for the target or victim of an attack. 
3 Hackers: Knights-errant or knaves? http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3078783/ 
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security to defend against the attacks.4 Naturally, each hacker prefers to receive information 
from the other hacker, but is reluctant to deliver information, though there are benefits from joint 
information sharing. We assume that both hackers and the defending firm are strategic actors. 
The opponent does not have a given, fixed, or immutable strategy, which has been common in 
much of prior  research in information security. The absence of an assumption about a fixed 
threat, or a fixed defense, enables a much richer analysis.  
 
In a related stream of work, Png, Tang and Wang (2005) focus on the strategic interaction 
among end-users and between users and hackers in a setting with a continuum of user types, and 
show that users’ effort in fixing depends on hackers’ targeting and vice-versa. Prior work (Choi, 
Fershtman, and Gandal 2004, Nizovtsev and Thursby 2005; Arora, Caulkins, and Telang 
2005) has examined issues such as incentives for security specialists to disclose security flaws 
and provide the appropriate patches  Other work (Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan 2005), 
and Anderson (2001)) has examined issues such as users’ incentives to invest in intrusion 
detection systems observed that many systems fail not for technical reasons so much as from 
misplaced incentives. 
 
While the two hackers may be interpreted as two individual agents seeking to exploit a firm, one 
can also interpret them as two firms who decide to gang up on a third rival firm to exploit its 
asset. The reason for this broad interpretation is that the terms “attack” and “defense” can be 
understood as metaphors. As Hirshleifer (1995) puts it, “falling also into the category of 
interference struggles are political campaigns, rent-seeking maneuvers for licenses and 
monopoly privileges (Tullock 1967), commercial efforts to raise rivals’ costs (Salop and 
Scheffman 1983), strikes and lockouts, and litigation – all being conflictual activities that need 
not involve actual violence.” Attack and defense are subcategories of attack-oriented and 
defensive competition. In this paper we use the more precise terms such as attack and defense, 
which can be substituted with synonyms such as struggle, conflict, battle, etc. 
 
Information sharing is technically complicated to analyze. Since our objective is to analyze 
information sharing among hackers, and not how the firm defends in a possibly different manner 
against two hackers who may be configured differently, we confine attention to two equivalent 
                                                 
4 We model competition between hackers and between hackers and the firm, but not between firms. The firm 
can be thought of as being a federal government institution or a public sector agency and hence competition at 
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hackers which makes the analysis tractable. This allows analyzing more specifically, the 
tradeoffs between information sharing and cyber attack, which are the two strategic choice 
variables for each hacker, in interaction with a defending firm which has one strategic choice 
variable-the level of investment in its security. 
 
One main difference between cyber attacks and information sharing is that the former requires 
costly funding, planning, sustained effort through time, involving buildup of infrastructure, 
culture, and competence, while the latter may be more or less costless for each hacker aside from 
the time spent in transferring the information. Attackers in the cyber era of course have 
information storage capacity, and they may even have compiled and stored information in an 
organized and secure manner. Deciding to share information with another hacker may not 
involve more than sending an electronic mail, or storing the information on a disk and delivering 
it. In other words, designing cyber attacks entail explicit costs on part of the hackers since all 
investments are generally costly, while information sharing does not have explicit costs, 
although the competitive advantage given to a hacker can be construed as an implicit cost. 
 
For firms defending against cyber attacks Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) find that security 
investments and information sharing are strategic complements. Gordon et al. (2003) find that 
when firms share information, each firm has reduced incentives to invest in information security. 
Hausken (2006) finds that security investments and information sharing are strategic substitutes. 
This paper examines these issues for two hackers. An important difference is that whereas two 
firms incur information leakage costs when sharing information about their vulnerabilities and 
security breaches, two hackers sharing information about a firm’s vulnerabilities do not incur 
costs in the same manner. In fact, as a hacker shares information about a firm with another 
hacker, the firm itself is the main entity suffering through incurring information leakage costs 
which are possible and often likely in all information transfers. 
 
The work by Gordon et al. (2003), Gal-Or and Ghose (2003, 2005), Hausken (2006), and also 
this paper, assume that information can be scaled along one dimension. Gordon et al. (2003) 
refer to a portion, which is a number between zero and one, of a firm’s computer security 
information that it may decide to share with the other firm. Similarly, Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) 
normalize the amount of security information being shared so that it always lies between 0 and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the firm level may not be critical in such situations. 
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1. Generally, information is multi-faceted, of different kinds, and with different degrees of 
importance for different purposes. In our context, a one-dimensional concept of information can 
be interpreted to mean that different kinds of information are given different weights according 
to their relative importance. 
 
Section 2 presents the model. We start with the case when the firm’s asset is exogenous. Section 
3 analyzes the model and presents some numeric analysis to provide insights. In section 4 we 
endogenize the firm’s asset, so that the firm makes a tradeoff between producing the asset and 
security investment needed for defending it. Section 5 assumes an upper constraint on each 
hacker’s fraction of the asset before it is closed down and provides some basic insights. Section 
6 discusses various extensions and limitations. Section 7 concludes with some discussion of the 
implications of our study. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider one firm with an asset r and two equivalent hackers i and j launching cyber attacks to 
acquire portions of the firm’s asset. The firm invests t to defend its asset, and the defense 
expenditure is f, where /f t∂ ∂ >0. The hackers invest Ti and Tj, respectively, to attack the asset, 
with attack expenditures Fi and Fj, respectively, where /i iF T∂ ∂ >0 and /j jF T∂ ∂ >0. For 
simplicity, we consider a linear function given by f=ct, Fi=θTi, Fj=θTj, where 1/c is the 
efficiency of cyber defense and 1/θ is the efficiency of cyber attack. This means that c and θ are 
the investment inefficiencies. They can also be interpreted as unit transformation costs. An 
attack means attempting to break through the security defense of the firm in order to appropriate 
something of value to the firm5. For simplicity, we assume risk neutral actors, which does not 
change the nature of the argument.  The expenditures ct, θTi, θTj can be interpreted as expenses 
in capital and/or labor. 
 
The cyber contest between the firm and the two hackers for the asset r takes the common ratio 
form (Tullock 1980). In the absence of information sharing, we consider the following contest 
success function: 
                                                 
5 This could be customer related information, business strategy information or accounting related information. 
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where g, Gi and Gj are the fractions of the firm’s asset that the firm, hacker i, and hacker j retain. 
The three fractions sum to one, g+Gi+Gj =1. As expected, the first fraction satisfies /g t∂ ∂ >0, 
/ ig T∂ ∂ <0, / jg T∂ ∂ <0. That is, the firm benefits from its own security investment, and suffers 
from the attacks launched by the two hackers. Similarly, the second fraction satisfies /iG t∂ ∂ <0, 
/i iG T∂ ∂ >0, /i jG T∂ ∂ <0, and similarly for the third fraction. These fractions imply that each 
hacker benefits from its own investment, but suffers a loss from the investment made by the firm 
and an attack by the other hacker on the firm.   
 
Hausken (2006) analyzes two interdependent firms subject to cyber attacks, and shows how 
increasing interdependence causes increased information sharing and decreased security 
investment. An attack against one firm gets partly propelled further to the other firm due to the 
interdependence, and a firm’s defense operates both against direct attacks and indirect attacks, 
where the latter are those proceeding through the other firm due to the interdependence. 
 
With two hackers, the interdependence between these is not relevant in the same sense for the 
following reasons. First, an attack launched by hacker i is directed against the firm, and it does 
not make sense to consider this attack as somehow also proceeding through hacker j to the firm. 
Secondly, the defense set up by the firm operates against the total sizes Ti and Tj of the two 
attacks, where the interdependence between the hackers plays no role. 
 
As a hacker’s attack level increases, it compiles more information about the firm’s 
vulnerabilities. Characteristics of the information are the type of firewalls, encryption 
techniques, access control mechanisms, intrusion detection systems, etc. employed by the firm, 
the training and procedures of the firm’s security experts, the nature of the defense, and the 
properties of the vulnerabilities. A lot of this information is publicly available. 
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Assume that hacker i decides to share an amount Si of information with hacker j, and that 
hacker j similarly decides to share an amount Sj of information with hacker i. Naturally, hacker i 
prefers to receive information from hacker j since it gets thereby more insight into the firm’s 
vulnerabilities and defensive strengths, which makes it better equipped to launch a successful 
attack. Analogously, hacker j prefers to receive information from hacker i. Based on this 
reasoning, we assume that hacker i’s overall attack has a strength equal to Ti+γSj, and that 
hacker j’s overall attack has a similar strength of size Tj+γSi, where the parameter γ  measures 
the effectiveness of information sharing relative to the attack in the composition of the overall 
attack. γ  varies between 0 and 1. With such information sharing, the contest success functions in 
(1) become equal to  
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 (2) 
These three fractions capture three important consequences from information sharing: First, it 
incorporates the fact that the firm suffers a loss from information sharing among the hackers. 
Second, hacker i benefits from receiving information from hacker j, but suffers a loss in utility 
from delivering information since hacker j gets a competitive advantage. This follows because 
γSj is present in the numerator in the second fraction in (2), while both γSj and γSi are present in 
the denominator. Consequently, the hackers can be expected to free ride on each other’s 
information sharing, and to the extent (2) is descriptive, no information sharing will occur. For 
the second fraction in (2), /i iH S∂ ∂ <0 and /i jH S∂ ∂ >0, and analogously for the third fraction 
/j iH S∂ ∂ <0 and /j jH S∂ ∂ >0. 
 
As the hackers share information with each other, synergies emerge. For instance, they discuss 
the available information, transformation occurs, missing pieces are filled in, and reasoning 
based on the joint information generates new knowledge. Joint information sharing by the two 
hackers can thus be expected to generate even deeper insight into the firm’s vulnerabilities and 
defense. To model this effect, we introduce the multiplicative term SiSj, and a parameter λ which 
scales the intensity of joint information sharing. Multiplicative terms are common to express 
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joint interaction. For example, in epidemiology, the rate by which the number of susceptible 
individuals (those that are not infected, but are capable of catching the disease and get infected) 
decreases is proportional to the product of the number of susceptible individuals and the number 
of infected individuals (Kermack and McKendrick 1927). Similarly, in Lanchester (1916) 
guerilla warfare the loss rate of each group is proportional to the product of the sizes of the two 
groups. This product expresses the number of contacts between the two groups.  
 
For a fixed number of individuals in the two groups together, the number of contacts is largest if 
the groups are equally large, and decreases as the groups grow unequal in size. Similarly, for 
information sharing, the joint benefit is large when both hackers contribute similarly large 
amounts of information, and decreases as the contributions grow unequal given that the sum of 
the contributions remains the same. If one hacker shares substantially, while the other hacker 
shares very little, the joint benefit is limited since the small amount of information can throw 
light on, supplement, and complement the large amount of information to a small extent.6 With 
such joint information sharing, the contest success functions in (2) can be written as 
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We let the two hackers share the benefit of their joint sharing so that each of them 
receives ( / 2) i jS Sλ . Equation (2) expresses the tradeoff each hacker makes between how much 
information to share and how much to withhold. Intuitively, it prefers to share sufficient 
information so that it reaps the benefits of joint information sharing. However, if it shares too 
much information, the other hacker is given an undue advantage because it can get a larger 
portion of the firm’s asset. This places an upper limit on how much information is optimal for a 
hacker to share. 
 
Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) and Hausken (2006) assume that two firms sharing information about 
their security breaches incur information leakage costs. Such costs are to a firm’s disadvantage. 
                                                 
6 One illustrative example is that 5×5=25 is larger than 2×8=16, although 5+5=2+8=10. 
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Basically, leakage of security vulnerabilities could increase consumers' apprehension of 
transacting with a firm. As a result some consumers may find it optimal to switch from one firm 
to its rival, thereby reducing its demand. When two hackers share information they possess 
about the firm’s vulnerabilities, security breaches, and defense characteristics, there can also be 
some information leakage. However, the costs from such leakage are borne by the firm. 
Although two hackers’ sharing may cause leakage through other networks and channels than 
when two firms share information, the information about security vulnerabilities pertains to the 
firm or firms which incur(s) substantial costs when such leakage occurs. For example, the 
information leak may progress to a firm’s rival, which may enable the rival to use this 
information strategically against its competitor. In contrast it’s plausible that such information 
sharing does not harm the hackers per se. After all, they have much less to lose. Hence, when 
one hacker shares information with another hacker and a leak occurs, we assume that the 
hackers incur no leakage costs; these costs affect the firm’s payoff.  
 
In accordance with Gal-Or and Ghose (2005), we assume that the leakage costs caused by 
information sharing by hacker i is given by the function ig = 2 21 2 3i j i jS S S Sφ φ φ− − , and 
analogously leakage costs caused by information sharing by hacker j, is given by the function 
jg = 2 21 2 3j i i jS S S Sφ φ φ− − . Note that these costs sum to 2 21 2 3( )( ) 2i j i jS S S Sφ φ φ− + − , where 
1φ ≥ 2 3φ φ+ . 
 
The profits u, Ui, Uj, of the firm, hacker i, and hacker j, respectively, are given by 
                         
2 2
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φ φ φγ γ λ
γ λ θγ γ λ
γ λ θγ γ λ
 (4) 
 
3. Analysis 
The firm’s free choice variable is the security defense expenditure level t. Hacker i’s free choice 
variables are the level of security attack Ti and the level of  information sharing Si. Analogously, 
hacker j’s free choice variables are Tj and Sj. The game proceeds as follows. The firm and the 
 12
two hackers choose their free choice variables simultaneously and independently to maximize 
profits. Calculating /i iU S∂ ∂ =0 and solving with respect to iS  gives 
                               
2 2 2 22 ( 2 ) 8
2
i j i j i
j
t T T t T T T
S
γ γ γ
γ
− + − + − + − −=  (5) 
This leads to the following observation: 
 
Observation 1. (i) Each hacker’s investment in an attack and the level of information sharing 
are strategic complements such that increasing one causes an increase in the other, and vice 
versa. (ii) One hacker’s attack and the other hacker’s information sharing are strategic 
substitutes such that increasing one causes a decrease in the other, and vice versa.7 
 
Note that an increase (decrease) in Tj on the right hand side of (5) causes an increase (decrease) 
in Sj on the left hand side. Similarly, an increase (decrease) in Ti on the right hand side of (5) 
causes a decrease (increase) in Sj on the left hand side.  
 
Observation 1 states that if one hacker were to increase its attack, then it also increases its level 
of information sharing. However, if a hacker receives more information from the other hacker, 
then it cuts back on its own attack level. It is useful at this stage to compare this result with prior 
work that looks at information sharing between two firms. When two firms share information 
and defend against one external hacker, Hausken (2006) finds that information sharing and 
security investments of the two firms are strategic substitutes. Gordon et al. (2003) find strategic 
substitutability under certain assumptions in the sense that when firms share information, each 
firm has reduced incentives to invest in information security.8 Gal-Or and Ghose (2003, 2005) 
find strategic complementarity so that that increased security investment by one firm leads to 
increased security investment and increased information sharing by its competitor. 
 
                                                 
7 Ideally one would like to generalize the above observation into a broader result using the implicit function 
approach after total differentiation of the three first-order conditions and sign the Hessian Matrix using Cramer’s 
Rule. We tried doing that. However, the resultant Hessian Matrix is impossible to sign without making some 
strong assumption about parameter values. Hence, we do not state this result as a formal Proposition. However, 
it is important to point out that the qualitative nature of the intuition and insights are the same.  Hence, we focus 
on discussing the results in the form of an Observation and contrast them with results from prior work.  
8 Information sharing and security investment are not pure strategic substitutes in Gordon et al.’s (2003) study. 
They provide necessary and sufficient conditions for information sharing to lead to increased or decreased 
security investment. 
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Next we derive the first order conditions. By setting /u t∂ ∂ =0, /i iU T∂ ∂ =0, /i iU S∂ ∂ =0, and 
thereafter substituting T=Ti=Tj and S=Si=Sj in equilibrium, gives the three first order conditions. 
 
                                          2 2
(2 (2 )): 0,
( 2( ) )
r T S SFOC t c
t T S S
+ + − =+ + +
γ λ
γ λ  (6) 
                                          
2
2 2
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r t T S r SFOC T
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Solving with respect to t, T, S, setting K=Ki=Kj and U=Ui=Uj in (3) and (4), and inserting into 
the profit functions u and U and gives the following interior solution: 
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The hackers’ overall attack level, which can also be referred to as the cumulative attack level, as 
seen from the two numerators in the last two expressions of equation (4), dependent on 
investment, information sharing, and joint information sharing and equals the following: 
                                                 2 2
2( / 2)
(2 )A
crT T S S
c
γ λ θ= + + = +  (10)  
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In equilibrium, AT   is independent of γ and λ. This also explains why the firm’s defense level 
t is independent of γ and λ, and u is independent of γ and λ when there are no leakage costs, i.e., 
when 1φ = 2 3φ φ+ . Further, note that the fractions k and K of the asset, where k+2K=1, accruing 
to the firm and to each hacker, respectively, are independent of γ and λ, and of the asset r. This 
leads to the following result. 
 
Proposition 1 (i) The fraction of the asset accruing to each hacker is equal to the ratio of the 
firm’s investment inefficiency, c, to the sum of the investment inefficiencies of all the three 
actors, 2θ+c.  
(ii) The  cumulative attack level AT  of the hackers is independent of both the effectiveness of 
information sharing, γ,  and the intensity of the joint information sharing, λ. 
 
(iii) Further, the cumulative attack level (i) increases in the inefficiency of the firm’s cyber 
defense at a decreasing rate, (ii) decreases in the inefficiency of the hacker’s cyber attack at an 
increasing rate and (iii) increases in the value of the firm’s asset. That is, /AT c∂ ∂ >0, 
2 2/AT c∂ ∂ <0, /AT θ∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/AT θ∂ ∂ >0, /AT r∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/AT r∂ ∂ =0. 
 
An interesting result is that the cumulative attack level TA of the hackers is not affected by the 
effectiveness γ of information sharing between hackers and moreover, is also unaffected by 
intensity λ of joint information sharing. This result can have some ramifications. For instance, 
organizations are always worried about the extent to which information sharing between hackers 
can adversely affect them. Our analysis reveals that the strength of the total attack is only related 
to the extent of the firm’s inefficiency in cyber defense, the hackers’ inefficiencies in attack and 
the asset value of the firm. If it turns out that information sharing between hackers does not 
enhance the attack intensities, then there is less cause for concern from such information sharing 
than it is thought to be. 
 
Proposition 2. As the extent of inefficiency of the cyber defense of the firm increases towards the 
extent of inefficiencies of the cyber attack of the two hackers, (that is, as  c increases towards 
2θ),  the firm’s security investment and the hackers’ information sharing decrease toward zero 
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but remain strictly positive, t>0 and S>0t. Conversely, the hackers’ attack level T reduces to 
zero for a value of c that is strictly below 2θ . 
 
Observe in (9) how each hacker’s inefficiency θ  is always preceded by 2, while the firm’s 
inefficiency c is preceded by 1, that is, it is equal to c. This occurs because there are two hackers, 
but only one firm. Furthermore, the firm does not defend itself when 2θ  < c. When the firm’s 
inefficiency is larger than the double inefficiency of each hacker, then the firm gives up its asset 
due to its intrinsic inefficiency in protecting its asset. The inequality can also be phrased as 1/c < 
1/2θ or as 2/c < 1/θ. This means that the defense efficiency 1/c of the firm must be at least 50% 
of the attack efficiency of each hacker in order for the firm to find it worthwhile to invest in 
some level of cyber defense. When the firm does not invest at all in defense, the two hackers 
share the firm’s asset and do not share information. 
 
When T = 0 according to Proposition 1, solving the first order conditions for t and S in (6) and 
(8) gives a third order equation set which is voluminous to set up and tedious to analyze 
generally. We thus confine our general discussion to the interior solution. The following 
proposition specifies the dependence of the six variables t, T, S, u, U, and K on the five 
parameters c, θ, γ, λ, r. 
 
Proposition 3. Assume φ1=φ2+φ3. Then,  
(i) the firm’s investment in cyber defense decreases at an increasing rate in the level of its own 
inefficiency. Further, the hackers’ level of information sharing increases at an increasing rate in 
the level of the firm’s inefficiency in cyber defense. Finally, the firm’s profit decreases at an 
increasing rate in its own inefficiency. That is, /t c∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/t c∂ ∂ >0, /S c∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/S c∂ ∂ >0, 
/u c∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/u c∂ ∂ >0. 
 
(ii) the hackers’ level of information sharing and pay-offs decrease at an increasing rate in the 
level of their inefficiency in cyber attacks. That is, /S θ∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/S θ∂ ∂ >0, /U θ∂ ∂ <0, 
2 2/U θ∂ ∂ >0. Further, when c/2 <θ < 3c/2, the firm’s investment in cyber defense increases at a 
decreasing rate in the level of the hackers’ inefficiency in cyber attacks. That is, /t θ∂ ∂ >0, 
2 2/t θ∂ ∂ <0 when c/2 <θ <3c/2. 
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(iii) the firm’s investment in cyber security is independent of the effectiveness of information 
sharing, γ,  i.e., /t γ∂ ∂ =0. Further, with respect to the effectiveness of information sharing, γ, a 
hacker’s investment in cyber attacks is decreasing at a decreasing rate, their level of information 
sharing is increasing linearly and their pay-offs are increasing at an increasing rate. Τhat is,  
/T γ∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/T γ∂ ∂ <0, /S γ∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/S γ∂ ∂ =0,  /U γ∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/U γ∂ ∂ >0. 
 
(iv) with respect to the intensity of the joint information sharing, λ., a hacker’s investment in 
cyber attacks is increasing at a decreasing rate, the level of information sharing between hackers 
is decreasing at an increasing rate and their pay-offs are decreasing at an increasing rate. Τhat is, 
/T λ∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/T λ∂ ∂ <0, /S λ∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/S λ∂ ∂ >0,  /U λ∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/U λ∂ ∂ >0. 
 
(v) with respect to the value of the firm’s asset, r, the firms’ investment in cyber security and the 
hacker’s investment in cyber attacks are increasing linearly. That is, /t r∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/t r∂ ∂ =0, 
/T r∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/T r∂ ∂ =0. Moreover, with respect to the value of the firm’s asset, while the 
hackers’ pay-offs increase linearly, their level of information sharing does not change. That is,  
/S r∂ ∂ =0,  /U r∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/U r∂ ∂ =0. 
 
(vi) the fraction of the firm’s asset accruing to each hacker increases at a decreasing rate in the 
level of the firm’s inefficiency in cyber defense and decreases at an increasing rate with its own 
inefficiency. That is, /K c∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/K c∂ ∂ <0, /K θ∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/K θ∂ ∂ >0. Conversely, the firm’s 
fraction decreases at an increasing rate in its own inefficiency while it increases at a decreasing 
rate in the hackers’ inefficiency. That is, /k c∂ ∂ <0, 2 2/k c∂ ∂ >0, /k θ∂ ∂ >0, 2 2/k θ∂ ∂ <0. 
.  
Figure 1: The variables t, T, S, u, U as functions of the firm’s unit cost c. 
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Figs. 1-5 illustrate Propositions 1-3 while also accounting for the corner solutions, with 
parameter values being set such that  c =γ =λ =0.5, θ =1, r =10, φ1=φ2+φ3, except in that figure 
where that parameter varies. Division with 5 and 2 are done for scaling purposes. As the firm’s 
unit cost of security investment c (or the level of inefficiency) increases from zero in Figure 1, 
the firm’s investment in cyber security decreases convexly, while the hacker’s investment in 
attack becomes inverse U shaped. A very low c implies that the firm’s security investment is 
highly efficient which reduces any incentives for the hacker to attack. On the other hand, a high 
value of c causes the hacker to cut back on its attack level since the firm’s defense is so modest.  
 
Figure 2: The variables t, T, S, u, U as functions of the hackers’ unit cost θ. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the variables change as a function of the unit cost of attack θ. The level of 
attack investment of the hackers, T, is low when θ is high, and is inverse U shaped otherwise. 
The firm’s defense level t also behaves in a similar manner. As θ decreases, information sharing 
increases, and so does the hackers’ profit levels. On the other hand, the firm’s profit decreases as 
θ decreases due to the intensity of the attack. As θ decreases below a critical value given by θ = 
0.37, the attack level T decreases to zero and information sharing takes over. Note that since θ is 
present only in the first order condition for T in (7), and not present in (6) and (8), the four 
variables t, S, u, U are constant when θ < 0.37. 
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Figure 3: t, T , S, u, U as functions of the hackers’ information sharing effectiveness parameter γ. 
 
Figure 3 depicts the dependence on γ which measures how effective information sharing is 
relative to the attack in the composition of the overall attack. When γ =0, there is no information 
sharing since it is not beneficial, but the attack is substantial. As γ increases, information sharing 
increases linearly and the attack level decreases convexly, eventually reaching zero as in Figure 
1. The firm’s defense level and profit is independent of γ as specified in Proposition 2. As γ 
increases above γ = 0.95, where T = 0, the development is similar to Figure 1, where S 
decreases to zero, after which t and u are constant. 
 
Also, we find that information sharing increases in a convex manner in c, and compensates for 
the decrease in attack levels as c increases. As T reaches zero in accordance with Proposition 3, 
we find that for c=1.04, a new phenomenon emerges which is determined by solving the third 
order equation set. The hackers start to free ride on each other’s information sharing so that the 
optimal level of information sharing S decreases. Also, the optimal level of investment by a firm 
in its security investment t decreases in the unit cost, but more moderately, and the firm’s profit 
increases until S=0. Interestingly, Gordon et al. (2003) who focus on the cost side effects of 
information sharing on the overall level of security, also demonstrate similar free riding 
effects in information sharing using a very different model. The free-rider dilemma with 
respect to security investments is further analyzed by Anderson (2001). 
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Figure 4: The variables t, T, S, u, U as functions of the intensity of joint information sharing λ. 
 
Figure 4 delineates the dependence on the intensity λ of joint information sharing. Substantial 
free riding in information sharing emerges as λ increases, causing S to decrease in a concave 
manner. The hackers’ compensate by increasing the attack T concavely, preserving the overall 
attack level TA constant as in Proposition  1. This also ensures that the firm’s security investment 
and pay off remains constant. The free riding among the hackers causes their profit U to 
decrease concavely. As λ decreases below λ = 0.14 where T = 0, information sharing and 
hacker profit decrease to zero when λ = 0.06, below which t and u are constant. 
 
Figure 5: The variables t, T, S, u, U as functions of the firm’s asset r. 
 
Figure 5 plots the dependence on the firm’s asset r. Note that all the variables increase linearly 
in r except information sharing, S, which is independent of r. That is, a firm’s cyber security 
investment  level, the hackers’ cyber attack levels and their pay-offs increase in the value of the 
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firm’s asset. As the asset value decreases below a critical value given by r = 2.78, the hackers 
do not find investing in an attack worth while, and consequently set their attack levels T = 0. As 
r decreases below a critical level given by r =1.12, information sharing levels, S, and hacker 
profit, U, decrease to zero, while the firm’s investment in cyber security, t, and its pay-off, u, are 
constant, similar to Figure 4. In sum, Figures 2, 4 and 5 provide some common insights. 
Similarly, Figures 1 and 3 provide some common insights 
 
4. Endogenizing the firm’s asset 
 
Considering the asset r as exogenously given is common in the rent seeking literature. However, 
rents and assets frequently have to be produced. Furthermore, since firms have limited resources, 
they make a tradeoff between producing the asset and investing in cyber security to defend it. 
This calls attention for the need to examine cases where the firm decided to endogenize the 
asset.  
 
Hausken (2005) has compared and contrasted rent seeking models and production and conflict 
models. To consider the latter assume that the firm has a resource R (e.g. a capital good, or 
labor) which can be divided into effort p to produce (build) the asset, and security investment t 
to defend or protect the asset from attack. With unit conversion costs a and b, respectively, of 
transforming the resource into defending versus producing the asset, the budget constraint for 
the firm is 
                                                                   R at bp= +  (11) 
Assume that the production function for the asset takes the following simple form, 
                                                                 ( ) /p R at b= −  (12) 
which follows from solving (11) with respect to p, and which means a linear production 
function. Substituting r with p in (4), and removing ct since the defense expenditure of security 
investment is now endogenized, (4) becomes 
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Calculating /u t∂ ∂ =0, /i iU T∂ ∂ =0, /i iU S∂ ∂ =0, and thereafter setting T=Ti=Tj and S=Si=Sj in 
equilibrium, gives the three first order conditions given as follows: 
 
                                   2: 2 ( ) ( 4 2 (2 )) 0FOC t R T S R S at t T S Sγ λ γ λ+ + − + + + =  (14) 
                                   
2
2 2
( )(2( ) ): 0
2 ( 2( ) )
R at t T S SFOC T
b t T S S
γ λ θγ λ
− + + + − =+ + +  (15) 
                                   : 2 ( ) ( ) 0FOC S T S S S tγ γ λ γ+ + − =  (16) 
Solving the above first order conditions with respect to t, T, S, gives us the following interior 
solution:                              
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γ θ θ( )2 24
0
4
b
b
>
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θλ
 (17) 
 
Confining attention to the interior solution, Figs. 6-11 illustrate how these variables change with 
respect to a given parameter. The other parameter values are set to similar levels as in section 3, 
that is γ=λ=0.5, θ=1, φ1=φ2+φ3. Additionally consider a=b=1 and R=10.  
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Figure 6: t, T, S, u, U as functions of the hackers’ unit defense cost a. 
 
Figure 6 shows how these variables change with respect to the unit defense cost a, and is similar 
to Figure 1 for the unit cost c, partly preserving the curvature. The firm’s cyber security 
investment level, t, and its pay-off function, u, decreases convexly. On the other hand, the 
hackers’ attack levels, T, is inverse U shaped, while their information sharing level S and pay-off 
functions U increase linearly. 
 
Figure 7: t, T, S, u, U as functions of the firm’s unit production cost b. 
 
Figure 7 shows the dependence on the firm’s unit production cost b. An increase in b is 
uniformly detrimental for all the variables causing them to decrease in a convex manner with the 
exception of T which is inverse U shaped. The reason is that when b is very low, the firm can 
easily increase it security investment t because such investments are highly efficient. This causes 
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the hackers to reduce their attack investment levels and rely on higher levels of information 
sharing instead. 
 
Figure 8: t, T, S, u, U as functions of the hackers’ unit cost θ. 
 
Figure 8 shows the dependence on the unit cost of attack θ, and is similar to Figure 2 for 4 of the 
5 variables, preserving the curvature. That is, T is inverse U shaped, u increases concavely, and S 
and U decrease convexly. The one exception is t which decreases in Figure 8 and is inverse U 
shaped in Figure 2. Differences like that are expected when endogenizing the firm’s asset. 
 
Figure 9: t, T, S, u, U as functions of the information sharing effectiveness γ. 
 
Figure 9 shows the dependence on γ  which measures the effectiveness of information sharing 
relative to the attack in the composition of the overall attack. Figure 9 is similar to Figure 3, and 
preserve a similar curvature for the different variables. That is, t and u are constant, while T 
decreases concavely, S increases linearly, and U increases convexly. 
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Figure 10: t, T, S, u, U as functions of the intensity of joint information sharing λ. 
 
Figure 10 shows the dependence on the intensity λ of joint information sharing. Figure 10 is 
similar to Figure 4, preserving the curvature. That is, t and u are constant, T increases convexly, 
and S and U decreases convexly. 
 
Figure 11: t, T, S, u, U as functions of the firm’s resource R. 
 
Figure 11 shows the dependence on the firm’s resource R. Note that similar to Figure 5, all the 
variables increase linearly in r except information sharing, S, which is independent of r.  
 
Summing up, we find that endogenizing the firm’s asset largely confirms the analysis with a 
fixed asset in Section 3. An increase in the unit production cost of the firm is detrimental for all 
the five variables except the hackers’ attack level which is inverse U shaped. 
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5. An upper bound on each hacker’s fraction of the asset 
 
In this section we discuss an extension where the hackers may not want to exceed a certain limit 
with regard to the proportion of the firm’s asset that they acquire. This can happen when  
hackers are apprehensive of undue attention and visibility that can cause them to be proactively 
targeted by the firm. If the hacker is subject to enforcement, it would not enjoy any benefit 
from targeting the firm’s asset beyond a certain limit. One of the key phenomena that has 
emerged over the last five years is that various kinds of software tools or code used for hacking 
(such as malware embedded in consumer software) are now being written for explicit financial 
rewards rather than for other purposes such as reputation. Indeed, a growing trend is that of a 
parallel economy of hackers, quite in the spirit of Adam Smith’s division of labor, in which 
some hackers specialize in tool creation, others trade vulnerabilities, others buy and sell credit 
card numbers, and then of course there are those who engage in spamming and phishing. This is 
starting to assume many of the aspects of the above-ground market, including externalities. For 
example, pay-TV operators now wait until one bad agent has established itself as the monopoly 
provider of forged smartcards (first-to-market usually removes incentives for further investment 
in forgery as it can undercut later competitors). Once this agent has x % of the market, which 
may be 5% or some other percentage dependent on the pay-TV operators tolerance and benefit-
cost analysis, they will close it down or the government can shut it down.9  
 
Just as it is virtually impossible to secure a computer against the most persistent hacker, it is also 
virtually impossible for a serial hacker to avoid detection and capture. No one can expect to 
succeed against all opponents forever. Indeed it has been documented that "cyber detectives" are 
out there laying traps for and ultimately apprehending "cyber criminals"(Kremen 1998). Besides 
the US, a large number of countries have adopted statutes designed to protect electronic 
commerce and information stored on computers internally. In many instances these countries 
cooperate with the United States in order to apprehend hackers operating inside their borders 
(Platt 1996). These laws can increases the penalties from being caught and as such may reduce 
the hackers’ incentives to grab more than a certain fraction of the target’s assets. This section 
provides some preliminary insights into the profits of the hacker and the firm in such situations. 
 
                                                 
9 We thank Ross Anderson for pointing this out and suggesting this example. 
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In our model, recall from (9) that the fraction of the firm’s asset accruing to each hacker is 
given by K = c/(2θ+c) when both hackers are symmetric in their capabilities. Let Q denote the 
threshold value of the firm’s asset acquired by each hacker beyond which the hackers are 
actively traced and targeted by enforcement authorities in order to be closed down. This could be 
an external agent like a government institution, or it could be a division within the firm itself 
which operates under other incentives and constraints than those assumed in the model in this 
paper. Thus, if the fraction of the firm’s asset accruing to each hacker is larger than this 
constraint, i.e., if K>Q, where the firm takes into account how many hackers operate near this 
threshold, each hacker exceeding the threshold gets closed down in some manner. 
 
Assume that the threshold Q, and also the inefficiencies c and θ of defense and attack, are 
common knowledge. The new optimization problem for each hacker then becomes as follows. If 
K<Q, which means that the firm’s threshold for being hacked is so large that it accepts that a 
fraction K of its asset r is confiscated by each hacker, then the solution in (9) and the discussion 
in the previous sections apply. Conversely, if K>Q, each hacker gets closed down if it is not 
intelligent, earning zero profit as its investment and information sharing eventually decrease to 
zero. (At the moment when it gets closed down, no longer earning a fraction of the asset, its 
profit is negative determined by its cost expenditure θT where T is given in (9).)  If K>Q and 
each hacker is intelligent, it chooses to hack a fraction K = Q - ε, where ε >0 is arbitrarily small 
but positive, which means that it hacks marginally less than the threshold level which causes its 
elimination. Since there are two hackers, these together earn the fraction 2(Q - ε), while the firm 
retains the remaining fraction 1-2(Q - ε). Using (3), (4) and (10), the fractions earned by the firm 
and each hacker are 
                         11 2( ),
2 2 2
A
A A
Tt kk Q K Q
t T t T
ε ε−= = − − = = = −+ +  (18) 
This implies that the cumulative attack level is given by 
                         
1 2( )A
QT t
Q
ε
ε
−= − −  (19) 
Suppose there are no leakage costs, i.e., φ1=φ2+φ3. Consider first the case when the firm decides 
to keeps its investment level t the same as in (9). Then, the firm’s profit is given by 
                         2
2 (2 )1 2( )
(2 )
c cu kr ct Q r
c
θε θ
 −= − = − − − + 
 (20) 
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If each hacker chooses its overall attack AT  to consist of security investment only, and no 
information sharing, that is, AT =T  and S=0, its profit is given by 
                         2
2 (2 )1 ( )
(2 ) [1 2( )]
cU Kr T Q r
c Q
θ θθ εθ ε
 −= − = − − + − − 
 (21) 
Two main changes are possible to this solution where an intelligent hacker hacks a limited 
fraction K = Q - ε  to avoid being caught. First, the firm may choose an alternative level of 
investment t than the solution in (9). That is, the firm may realize that each of two hackers are 
intelligent and will choose AT =T  as determined in (19) which is dependent on t. Since the 
fractions accruing to each hacker are fixed and predetermined as in (18), this becomes a 
coordination game where the firm and each hacker adjust their investments t and T so that (18) is 
satisfied. To minimize their costs, one solution is that both parties reduce their investments t and 
T toward zero while (18) is satisfied, though that solution seems hard to occur in practice. 
 
The other possible change to the solution in (20) and (21) is that the hacker chooses another 
allocation between security investment and information sharing instead of setting AT =T  and 
S=0. A simple solution is to assume that the hackers agree that investment is costly while 
information sharing is not, and hence choose only to share information. That is, Ti=Tj=T=0. 
Setting the left hand side of (10) equal to the right hand side of (19) gives 
                                                 2( / 2)
1 2( )
QS S t
Q
εγ λ ε
−+ = − −  (22)  
Substituting the value of  2
2 (2 )
(2 )
r ct
c
θ
θ
−= +  gives us the following equation                         
2 2( 1 2( ))( 2 ) 4 ( )( 2 )
1 2( )( 2 )
Q c r Q c
Q c
S
− + − + + − −− + − + − +=
γ ε θ ε θ λγ ε θ
λ  (23) 
The firm’s profit u remains as in (19) while each hacker’s profit is given by10 
                         ( )U Kr Q rε= = − . (24) 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 A possible alternative to the method in this section may be to perform some kind of a constrained 
optimization with Lagrangian multipliers. 
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6. Extensions and limitations 
 
In our analysis, we have only considered symmetric equilibrium, implying that both hackers 
have equal characteristics and thus are equally efficient in utilizing the shared security 
information in attacking firms. A future extension could involve looking at asymmetric 
situations between hackers, where hackers have unequal characteristics in various respects. 
Asymmetry is analytically more challenging, with less likelihood of analytical solutions for 
the most general scenarios. Our results are robust to some extensions such as changes in 
timelines of the game. For example, it is possible to envisage a scenario in which all three actors 
first chose security attacks Ti, Tj and t, and then in the next stage, the two hackers choose sharing 
levels Si, Sj simultaneously. The notion being that cyber security investments are long term 
decisions, and hence are chosen before information sharing decisions which are in principle easy 
to change. Our preliminary analysis reveals that there is no major qualitative change in results in 
such a game.  
 
Further, another limitation is that we have only considered a scenario with two hackers. 
Generalizing this research to include n hackers could be an interesting extension but becomes 
analytically tedious in our setup. However, we conjecture that many of the qualitative insights of 
our model carry through to a situation with more than two hackers. A difference is that a firm 
facing more than two hackers is subject to an opposition which may share information in more 
sophisticated manners than what is accounted for in the current model which distinguishes 
between effectiveness of information sharing and intensity of joint information sharing. 
 
Other extensions are to different kinds of security investment, and distinguishing between 
different kinds of information that hackers can share. Information is multidimensional. It may 
pertain to high level or low level security breaches, methods and success of earlier attacks, 
identities of hackers, and secrets about research, development, future plans, trade, capacities, 
personnel dispositions, etc. 
 
Despite these limitations, we believe that our model addresses an important issue, and hope 
that the proposed approach may be used as a starting point for additional research in this area. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The paper considers a scenario where one firm is subject to a cyber attack by two external 
hackers. The hackers choose the optimal level of information to share with each other about the 
firm’s vulnerabilities and security breaches, and choose the optimal attack levels. The firm 
chooses the optimal defense, which is costly and consists in investing in information technology 
security to protect its asset. The hackers collect information in various manners, and attempt to 
gain access to the information the firms collect about their security breaches. Each hacker 
prefers to receive information from the other hacker about the firm’s vulnerabilities. Providing 
information to the other hacker places the other hacker in a better position when competing for 
the firm’s asset. The hackers benefit from joint information sharing. The paper analyzes the 
extent to which a hacker has incentives to provide information voluntarily to the other hacker, 
and the tradeoffs each hacker makes between sharing information and investing in an attack, 
which is costly. Each hacker thus has two free choice variables, and the firm has one free choice 
variable. 
 
The paper shows that each hacker’s attack and information sharing are strategic complements 
such that increasing one causes an increase in the other, and vice versa. Conversely, one 
hacker’s attack and the other hacker’s information sharing are strategic substitutes such that 
increasing one causes a decrease in the other, and vice versa.  
 
The paper defines an overall attack for the hacker which is a weighted sum of three components: 
(i) the investment in an attack, (ii) the amount of information sharing, and (iii) the amount of 
joint information sharing. Each of the two hackers substitutes between these three components 
such that the relative weights of the second and third components do not, remarkably, affect the 
defense security investment of the defending firm, and also do not affect the fractions of the 
asset accruing to each hacker and the firm. For the special case of no leakage costs, the firm’s 
profit is also unaffected by the relative weights of the second and third components. The firm is 
affected by the hackers’ overall attack level, and not their tradeoffs between the three 
components. The overall investment in attack increases concavely in the firm’s unit defense 
cost, decreases convexly in the hackers’ unit cost of attack, and increases linearly in the firm’s 
asset. 
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As the firm’s unit cost of security investment increases from zero towards twice the hackers’ 
unit cost of attack, the attack follows an inverse U shaped function and reaches zero while the 
firm’s security investment and the hackers’ information sharing levels remain positive. 
Specifically, while the firm’s cyber security investment and profit decrease convexly, the 
hackers’ information sharing increases convexly, and the hackers’ profits increase as well. 
 
As the hackers’ unit cost of attack increases, the firm’s profit increases, while the hackers’ 
information sharing and profit decrease convexly. The firm’s defense and the hackers’ attack are 
inverse U shaped for some regions in the parameter space. As the effectiveness of information 
sharing relative to the investment in cyber attack in the composition of the overall attack 
increases, the firm’s defense and profit are constant, the hacker’s attack levels decrease 
convexly, their information sharing increases linearly, and their profit increases convexly.  
 
As the intensity of joint information sharing increases, the firm’s defense and profit are constant, 
the attack increases concavely, and the hackers’ information sharing and profit decrease 
convexly. Increasing the firm’s asset causes all the variables to increase linearly, except 
information sharing which is constant. We also find that endogenizing the firm’s asset largely 
confirms the analysis with a fixed asset. Increasing the unit production cost is detrimental for all 
the five variables except the hackers’ attack which is inverse U shaped. 
 
A few policy implications and managerial insights of the analyses merit some discussion. First, 
our analysis also reveals that the cumulative attack level of the hackers is not affected by the 
effectiveness of information sharing between them and moreover, is also unaffected by the 
intensity of joint information sharing. If it turns out that information sharing between hackers 
does not enhance their attack intensities, then there is possibly less cause for concern from such 
information sharing than it is thought to be. This result can have some ramifications on firms’ 
incentives and strategies regarding their adversarial contest with hackers especially in situations 
involving industrial espionage which is widely being touted as new mantra for hackers. It also 
undermines to some extent, the importance of the truthful revelation of information by hackers 
to each other. 
 
Second, our analysis suggests the need to heighten firm’s awareness that hackers not only 
choose strategically how much to invest in an attack, and that hackers may compete with each 
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other in attacking more successfully, but also that hackers may cooperate through sharing 
information with each other about a firm’s vulnerabilities. Firms may defend themselves by 
designing their security investments such that when it is breached by one hacker, the sensitive 
information may quickly become obsolete which limits the potential vulnerability if the 
information is transferred elsewhere. Also, if a firm knows the identity of the hacker that has 
breached its security, it may focus on not only blocking future attacks by this hacker, but also on 
providing incentives to the hacker so that the sensitive information does not get transferred to 
other hackers. Such incentives can be of monetary, informational, political, persuasional, or 
disinformational nature.  
 
Finally, if a hacker’s information sharing can be reduced, strategic complementarity with the 
hacker’s attack also reduces the latter. This suggests compartmentalization, in some sense or 
other, the interaction of hackers with each other or designing incentives to isolate them from 
each other rather than treating them as one monolithic group which acts in unison. Moreover, the 
fact that the intensity of information sharing and effectiveness of sharing have opposite impact 
on hackers’ investment in attacks, their information sharing levels and profits provides further 
insights into mechanisms that firms can design to take preventive measures and thwart cyber 
attacks.
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Proof: The proof follows from inserting (9) into (10) and considering the signs of the first and 
second derivatives of (10). These are 
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Proof of Proposition 2  
 
Insert c=2θ-ε into (9) where ε>0 is arbitrarily small but positive. This causes the second term 
within the bracket in the expression for T to be arbitrarily large and positive, which means that 
the expression for T becomes negative with arbitrarily large absolute value. Since the hackers’ 
attack cannot be negative, this gives T=0, t>0, S>0 for a sufficiently small ε. QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 3  
 
This follows from considering the signs of the first and second derivatives of (9). 
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 (ii) 
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(vi) 
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